

HAMAS: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow—

NO PARTNER FOR PEACE



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HAMAS' "PROTOCOLS OF TERROR" IN ITS OWN WORDS

THE CHARTER OR "SACRED COVENANT" (AL-MITHAQ) (1988) :

PREAMBLE: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it'. (The Martyr, Imam Hassan al-Banna, of blessed memory). . . . Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious. It needs all sincere efforts. . . . The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realized."

ARTICLE 7: "'The Day of Judgment will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him. Only the Gharkad tree . . . would not do that because it is one of the trees of the Jews'" [citing "al-Bukhari and Moslem"]

ARTICLE 8: "Allah is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes."

ARTICLE 15: "'I swear by the holder of Mohammed's soul that I would like to invade and be killed for the sake of Allah, then invade and be killed, and then invade again and be killed.'" [quote from "the Emigration," verse 13]

ARTICLE 17: "[Y]ou you find them [the Jews] giving . . . constant attention through information campaigns, films, and the school curriculum, using for that purpose their lackeys who are infiltrated through Zionist organizations under various names and shapes, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, espionage groups and others, which are all nothing more than cells of subversion and saboteurs."

ARTICLE 22: "They [the Jews] strived to amass great and substantive material wealth which they devoted to the realization of their dream. With their money, they took control of the world media, news agencies, the press,

HAMAS' "PROTOCOLS OF TERROR" IN ITS OWN WORDS

publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world with the purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. . . .With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there. You may speak as much as you want about regional and world wars. They were behind World War I, They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it."

ARTICLE 28: "The Zionist invasion is a vicious invasion. It does not refrain from resorting to all methods, using all evil and contemptible ways to achieve its end. It relies greatly in its infiltration and espionage operations on the secret organizations it gave rise to, such as the Freemasons, The Rotary and Lions clubs, and other sabotage groups. All these organizations, whether secret or open, work in the interest of Zionism and according to its instructions. They aim at undermining societies, destroying values, corrupting consciences, deteriorating character and annihilating Islam. It is behind the drug trade and alcoholism in all its kinds so as to facilitate its control and expansion. . . . Israel, Judaism and Jews challenge Islam and the Moslem people. 'May the cowards never sleep!'"

ARTICLE 31: "The Zionist Nazi activities against our people will not last for long. "For the state of injustice lasts but one day, while the state of justice lasts till Doomsday."

ARTICLE 32: "The Zionist plan is limitless. After Palestine, the Zionists aspire to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. . . . Their plan is embodied in the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion', and their present conduct is the best proof of what we are saying. . . . The Islamic Resistance Movement considers itself to be the spearhead of the circle of struggle with world Zionism and a step on the road."

HAMAS' BATTLE CRIES:

"I will cast terror into the hearts of those who have disbelieved, so strike them over the necks, and smite all their fingers and toes. You have killed them not, but Allah killed them!"

"Truly, the destruction of the state of Israel is a Quranic inevitability."

"The language of bullets and bombs is the only language that the Jews understand."

"We tell them [the Israelis]: in as much as you love life—the Muslims love death and martyrdom."

" Hamas, Hamas, Jews to the gas! "

"Israel, by virtue of its being Jewish and of having a Jewish population, defies Islam and the Muslims."

"The Jews are a cancer that is spreading and is threatening the entire Islamic world."

"[Jews are] brothers of the apes, assassins of the prophets, bloodsuckers, and war mongers. . . . Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream."

"They [the Zionists'] established a state to protect the Jews from death and murder. If death and murder chase them in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Netanya . . . then they will say: I want to flee and go back to Europe and America."

"The Islamic Movement gives it condolences to the hero of the attack [at Beit Lid in January 1995], which led to the killing of twenty pigs and injuring of sixty monkeys."

"The war is open until Israel ceases to exist and until the last Jew in the world is eliminated."

"You [America] will face the mirror of your history for a long time to come. . . . [With the 9/11 attacks] Allah has answered our prayers."

HAMAS' BATTLE CRIES:

"We are in love with the color of blood."

"Palestine is a green tree whose thirst can only be quenched with the blood of martyrs."

"Our words remain dead until we die in their cause."

" Hamas has won the election on the Israeli body county ticket."

"When the blood of martyrs irrigates the land, roses appear."

"The children are the holy martyrs of tomorrow."

Introduction: Behind the New Flare Up in the Holy Land— Hamas’ Ambitions

There is a rabbinic dictum that—after the last biblical Prophet—only fools prophesize. It would be sheer folly to try to predict where the dominos will ultimately fall in the Arab World. Still, one core assumption has been swept away by today’s seismic upheavals: the time-worn mantra that “the Palestinian-Israeli conflict” is at the core of the Middle East’s problems. From Tunisia, to Libya, to Egypt and now Syria and beyond to the Islamic State of Iran, it’s the regimes’ corruption and crimes, not the Holy Land, that brought millions to the streets to brave arrest, torture, or a bullet.

Yet nobody should be surprised that the enemies of peace and democracy, whatever their terrorist faction, are exploiting in the Holy Land the combustible regional situation by targeting deep into Israel’s cities and Ashdod and Bersheeba with deadly accurate Grad missiles and blowing up a Jerusalem bus station, killing 1 and injuring 39.

What about the “Palestinian Street”? Demonstrations in the West Bank and abortive demonstrations in Gaza have protested failed policies and demanded reconciliation between the Mahmoud Abbas-led PA and Hamas. Despite death threats, President Abbas has even offered to travel to Gaza to break the current impasse. Initially, he was rebuffed by a newly emboldened Hamas that may have lost support in Gaza but is gaining it in the West Bank, while rebuilding and upgrading its military capabilities—with help from Iran. But now Abbas has met with top Hamas officials in the West Bank City of Ramallah because “There would be no peace achieving the aspirations of our people without ending the split.”

Hamas is also buoyed by the growing clout of its founder—Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Poised to play an ever-growing role in the post-Mubarak era, it wants Egypt to open up its Gaza border to open transfer of hi-tech arm shipments. There are already indications that the U.S. and Europe may view the changing landscape in the Arab world as an opportunity to begin dialogue with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Taliban, and even Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Will Hamas be next?

In Gaza City, Hamas must feel that time is now on its side.

Could a rapprochement between Hamas and the PA-Fatah enhance the prospects for Mideast peace? Don’t count on it. In Gaza, Hamas finds it easier to launch missiles against Israel than new “human bombs,” but the cult of the suicide bomber is still alive-and-well. The late Dr. Aziz Rantisi, trained as a pediatrician, called becoming a suicide martyr “among the highest, if not the highest, honor.” Hamas still shouts, “The blood of our martyrs will not be wasted on the negotiating table.” Schools venerate those who blow themselves up, even as Hamas threatens UNWRA for daring to suggest teaching about the Nazi Holocaust. Mariam Farahat, three of whose six sons died as suicide bombers, won election on Hamas’ slate as Umm Nidal: “Mother

of the Struggle.” She says: “Those who say we have changed our methods, we will never change.” The experience of Gaza’s Christian community provides an idea of what would happen on the West Bank and East Jerusalem if Hamas ever took over those areas. Announcing “the end of secularism and heresy in the Gaza Strip,” Hamas immediately targeted the Strip’s handful of Greek Orthodox.²⁰

A Palestinian government including Hamas would mean no “two state solution,” no freedoms, and no peace for years and maybe decades. There is no nuancing Hamas’ genocidal, “Protocols of Zion”-spouting founding Charter. When it comes to “Zionists,” there is zero daylight between their civil society and military wing. Hamas’ military infrastructure is as interwoven with hate for Israel, as its civilian infrastructure is embedded with missiles aimed at the Jewish State’s heartland.

Previous attempts at Hamas-Fatah rapprochement actually led to escalating violence and outright civil war in Gaza in June 2007. Back in September 2000, Yasser Arafat rejected an American-mediated peace deal. Launching the Second Intifada, Arafat (in the words of Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu) bestowed “embraces and kisses” on Hamas, even copying its suicide bombing campaign. Arafat came to rue his decision, as did his successor Abbas who in 2007 declared: “It is Hamas that is shielding Al Qaeda, and through its bloody conduct, Hamas has become very close to Al Qaeda [in Gaza].”²¹

The world should think long and hard before agreeing to drink the ‘let’s engage Hamas’ moderates Kool-aid. Let’s remember it’s been concocted by the same academic and foreign policy elites who were wrong about Khomeini in 1979 and who have been as clueless as everybody else about the Arab world’s new ongoing tsunamis.

Peace in the Holy Land will not come via appeasement of Hamas and demonization of Israel. Want democracy and freedom for Palestinians and security for Israelis? Then, stick to the goal of two democratic states—one Arab, one Jewish—with transparency on both sides. Anything less remains a prescription for disaster.

This Report details Hamas history as well as its present ambitions. It documents the rise (in Netanyahu’s words) of “Hamastan . . . [as] a proxy of Iran in the image of the Taliban.” It avoids media spin—especially the anti-Israel bias of so much mainstream media coverage.²²

Because “past is prologue,” we need to do all we can to prevent a Palestinian-Israeli future under the dark shadow of Hamas.

Deep History: Hamas Before There Was a Hamas

Created in 1988 during the opening year of the First Intifada, Hamas (meaning “zeal” and an acronym in Arabic for the Islamic Resistance Movement) has pre-World War II roots as far back as the 1929 anti-Jewish Riots and 1936-1939 Arab Uprising in the British Palestine Mandate. The point is that—before there was a Jewish state—the idea of Palestine with any Jewish community enjoying autonomy, was already anathema to the men who were Hamas’ precursors and pioneers.²³

The periods before, during, and immediately after World War II was also the crucible in which was forged the culture of both the secular and religious versions of Palestinian anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish nationalism. The leadership of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin al-Husayni—ally of Hassan al-Banna (originator of Hamas’ parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood) as well as Adolf Hitler—inspired Hamas’ own founding father, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.²⁴

Yet Yassin also grew up under the influence of the legendary Sheikh’Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the expatriate Syrian firebrand whom the British Palestine authorities named “the brigand sheikh” and killed in a 1935 shootout for leading his “black hand gang” in the preliminary campaign of anti-Jewish violence that laid the groundwork for the 1936-1939 Uprising. The namesake of Hamas’ military wing, the Qassam Brigades, Shiekh al-Qassam became the stuff of legend and folklore including nationalist songs which Hamas later changed references to shepherds to “pilgrims” in order to be more in tune with Islamist ideology.²⁵

Followers of al-Din, the Grand Mufti, and Muslim Brotherhood founder al-Banna, all fought during the 1936-1939 Uprising, and some became Nazi operatives during World War II. The Egyptian-based Brotherhood, of which Hassam is the Palestinian wing, opened its first offices in Jerusalem in 1945 and Gaza in 1946, again providing fighters against Israel during the 1948 War of Independence. Assassinated in Egypt in 1949, Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna never set foot in Palestine, but Hamas considers him a “martyr” to their cause.²⁶

Born in 1936 in the village of Jora near now what is Ashkelon, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his family fled in 1948 under Egyptian Army urgings to a Gaza refugee camp where he grew up, suffering a paralyzing injury that made him wheel-chair bound from the age of twelve. Educated as a school teacher, Yassin—despite of or because of his infirmity—was glorified by Hamas as “the miracle sheikh,” “mutilated king,” and “throbbing heart of the Intifada.” His masterminding of suicide missions during the Second Intifada was the reason for his “targeted killing” by the Israelis in March 2004.²⁷

The key figure among the leadership group including Dr. Abdek Aziz Rantisi, Dr. Mahmoud Zahar, Salah Shehadah, and Musa Abu Marouq that officially founded Hamas in January 1988, Yassin derived his pre-eminence largely from his organizational genius. In 1973, when this

founding group's emphasis was still on educational and political "Islamization," not militarization of their struggle, Yassin launched *al-Mujama al-Islamiya*, "The Islamic Center." This extraordinarily successful front group orchestrated a growing empire of schools and sports facilities, medical and drug treatment clinics, orphanages, and Quranic schools. Financial support came from the *zakat* (charitable donations) as well as grants primarily from the Gulf States. Making a decision it later regretted, Israel tolerated this Islamist network as a political counterweight to Yasser Arafat's larger, violent secular-nationalist PLO. *Al-Mujama* even received an Israeli government license—not revoked until 1989—allowing it to operate in the open, unlike the clandestine PLO. Around 1980, Yassin's organization was ready to combat the PLO politically, winning sometimes violent clashes at the Islamic University in Gaza and for control of Palestinian professional organizations.²⁸

Yassin's circle began to militarize in the early 1980s, with the founding of the embryonic *Mujahidoun al-Filistinioun* (Palestinian Fighters). He was arrested and sentenced by the Israelis in 1984 to 13 years for smuggling weapons and amassing an illegal arms cache in his house. This episode set the stage for the later founding in 1990 during the First Intifada of the Qassam Brigades, but the Israel authorities—who released Yassin after only 11 months imprisonment—still did not grasp the seriousness of the threat. Not until 1989, when Hamas killed two Israeli soldiers, did the government really crack down, again incarcerating Yassin.²⁹

Hamas' Own "Protocols": The 1988 Charter

Issuing its fist communiqué in December 1987, the month that the spontaneous First Intifada ("shaking off" in Arabic) ignited, and formally organizing in January 1988, Hamas promulgated its Charter or "Sacred Covenant" that August. As historian Robert Wistrich points out, the Hamas Covenant—in stark contrast to the founding document of the PLO/Fatah, drawn up 20 years earlier—is permeated with religious references: mentioning Allah over 100 times, quoting the Quran thirty-three times, in addition to six references to the hadith and seven to the Prophet Muhammad. Significantly, the emphasis is entirely on what in Muslim religious doctrine is called "lesser jihad"—holy war "by the sword" on Islam's enemies—rather than "greater jihad": the individual's spiritual struggles. There also is no mention of the Quran's prohibitions against killing civilian innocents or against suicide.³⁰

Hamas' theologians—believing in "an eye for an eye"—preferred to use the term "martyrdom operation" (*amaliyyat itishhadiyyah*) rather than "suicide operation" (*amaliyyat intihariyya*). But the "happy martyrs" who strapped on suicide belts had little use for verbal semantics. They were men (and women) of action, disdaining words for bloody deeds, much as had fascist and anarchist suicide killers and Japanese kamikazes of earlier generations.³¹

Yet Hamas' Charter is also a unique fusion of Islamic theology (the most rigid, harsh version) with apocalyptic secular conspiracy theories and lethal anti-Semitism borrowed from Europe. Its

authoritative secular text is the notorious forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, cited or alluded to in Articles 22, 28, and 32, but influencing the document throughout. We refer the reader back to the opening pages of this Report, quoting the Charter extensively, especially Articles 28 and 32 on the alleged coordinated plot by Zionists, Freemasons, and even the Rotary Club to pollute society with drugs and alcohol, control all material wealth as well as the media, and drive the world into an endless series of wars until their conspiracy destroys Islam and creates an imperialist-colonialist Jewish State from “the Nile to the Euphrates.” Only a global jihad spearheaded by Palestinian Muslims can prevent this nightmarish result.³²

Translating traditional Islamic anti-Jewish prejudice into an end-of-the-world prophecy of ultimate Jewish-Zionist defeat and annihilation, Hamas’ Charter quoted Mohammed, but owed a much more immediate debt to exterminationist anti-Semites inspired by *The Protocols*. As Wistrich writes, the Hamas Charter “could have been written by a committee of experts composed of Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, [and] Henry Ford, and a whole bevy of French, Austrian, Polish or Russian anti-Semites” Most of Wistrich’s “committee” would have come from the political right, but in recent decades new names in the U.S., UK, France, Spain, and Norway and Sweden as well as the Arab and Muslim world could be added on the political left.³³

Does Hamas really believe in such malevolent madness? To quote Dr. Rantisi: “You know, when I first heard about this document [*The Protocols*], I didn’t want to believe it. But then I saw what was happening in Palestine and I could see that it was genuine.”³⁴

Hamas’ Charter has taken its place as a critical link in a lethal chain—linking medieval with modern (and post-modern) Jew-hatred that electrifies the current Middle East, where Arab, Turkish, and Farsi translations of *The Protocols* top best seller lists and Egyptian, Lebanese, and Iranian satellite television networks compete in popularizing and dramatizing its toxic conspiracy theories—together with theories denying the Holocaust ever happened, and that it should be made to happen now by “wiping Israel off the map.”³⁵

Hamas and Suicide Bombing I—The Terror Strategy

Modelled on pro-Iranian Hezbollah’s 1980s successes in deploying suicide truck bombs against the U.S. Marine Corps Barracks and U.S. Embassy and the French military compound to drive the Americans and French out of Lebanon as well as blow up Saddam Hussein’s Beirut Embassy, Hamas’ own suicide campaign started in two stages—in 1993-1994 and 1996. Initially, it was poorly organized and implemented. In theory, the suicide bomber—a human “smart bomb”—was the ideal answer to Israel’s hi-tech weaponry, but in practice things were more complicated. Suicide bombing did not become Hamas’ “official policy” until 1994, though the tactic started with an April 1993 car bomb attack outside the cafeteria of a West Bank settlement that managed only to kill one Arab worker. This results got bloodier with the

breakthrough of Hamas' Yahya Ayyash—"The Engineer"—in perfecting the suicide explosive belt.³⁶

How successful was Hamas' initial resort to suicide terrorism in furthering its political objectives? Viewing Hamas primarily as a "national liberation movement" against "foreign occupation," political scientist Robert Pape offers a cost-benefit analysis in which the suicide bomber—easy to recruit and train—was a low-cost "commodity" or "valued asset" who paid a handsome "profit" by putting Hamas on the political map at the expense of both the Israelis and Yasser Arafat's Fatah. Fatah—in the wake of the Oslo process and the peace deal signed on the White House lawn—was in the process of relocating from its Tunisian exile to the West Bank's Ramallah. Pape considers the 1993-1994 suicide attacks as a Hamas' success because Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin diagnosed the root cause as grassroots Palestinian anger at continuing Israeli control political control of the Territories and responded by speeding up—not slowing down—Israel's handover of West bank towns to Arafat.³⁷

Though Hamas did, indeed, claim credit for accelerated Israeli withdrawals, it never articulated this as the primary motive of its suicide terror campaign. Instead, it pictured the attacks as "retaliation" for Israeli provocations—first, the peace process itself, which Hamas viewed as an American-Zionist-PLO conspiracy to betray the Palestinian cause—and then as payback for Baruch Goldstein's massacre in February 1994 in Hebron of Muslim worshippers, killing 29 Muslims at prayer in a room in the Cave of the Patriarchs used as a mosque and wounding of 125 others. After 40 days of mourning, Hamas responded with suicide attacks on buses in Afula and Hadera.³⁸

Again, in early 1996, when Hamas launched the next phase of its suicide terror campaign, its proclaimed rationale was retaliation for Israeli intelligence's killing by means of a booby-trapped phone of Hamas' famed "Engineer" Ayyash. Hamas' response included suicide attacks in Ashdod, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv claiming 60 lives. But if the real purpose of the 1996 attacks had been the speedup of Israeli withdrawals, they failed. Instead, the effect of the 1996 attacks was seismic, swaying Israeli voters toward a Likud government that took a tougher line. Nevertheless, most analysts consider the results a "dual purpose" success for Hamas—exactng revenge while at the same time weakening Arafat and Israel's "doves" as well as undermining the peace process. This may, indeed, have been Hamas' ulterior motive, but its purposes remained ambiguous and murky rather than a coherent political strategy.³⁹

The one undeniable result of the 1993-1996 terror campaign was to "put Hamas on the political map" and make suicide bombings its signature strategy. Hamas' suicide operations continued at a slower pace during the last years of the 1990s. Israel's and Arafat's intelligence establishments regrouped, and both—for their separate reasons—launched crackdowns that kept Hamas off balance, politically and militarily. Among the few bright spots for Hamas was the botched assassination attempt in Jordan on Hamas' Khalid Mishal, which forced Israel to release Sheikh

Yassin in order to end a major diplomatic embarrassment. Yet Hamas was not decisively stronger at the end of the decade than it had been at the beginning of the 1990s in the wake of Persian Gulf War.⁴⁰

Hamas and Suicide Bombing II: The Cult of Death

All this changed in the flash of an eye when Yasser Arafat, in September 2000, decided that he could not survive accepting the new U.S.-mediated peace proposal from Ehud Barak's Labor Government offering 92 percent of the West Bank plus a capitol in East Jerusalem. Launching the Second Intifada, Arafat converted his Tanzim militia into the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade to compete with—and organizationally “outbid”—Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups in suicide terror operations. On the other hand, Palestinian terror groups cooperated by forming “cocktail cells” spanning the organizational divide. Such attacks increased seven-fold compared to the 1990s. Arafat meant to carefully manage his new resort to suicide bombing from “the top down,” but the Pandora's box spiralled out of control opening a new era of large-scale suicide terrorism. For Israel, this amounted to a protracted slow-motion 9/11.”⁴¹

November 2, 2000, witnessed the first new car bomb attack, killing two Israelis near Jerusalem's Mahane Yehuda Market. There followed a paroxysm of attacks including the June 1, 2001, suicide bombing claiming the lives of 21 young Israelis outside a Tel Aviv disco. On August 9, 2001, came the ghastly attack on the Sbarro Pizzeria, killing 15. Hamas took satisfaction that during this period “only” three Palestinians died in Israeli retaliatory strikes for one Israeli killed by suicide attackers. Perhaps the worst attack in terms of the psychic toll was the Netanya Passover massacre in March 2002, killing 28 (including Clara Rosenberger and other Holocaust Survivors) and injuring 140. Palestinian attacks accounted for the deaths of 130 Israelis and foreigners during that March alone. Disguised as a woman, the bomber, 25 year-old Abdel-Basset Odeh, temporarily gave his West Bank hometown of Tulkarm a notoriety rivalling Jenin—Hamas' “suicide capitol.” Joel Brinkley in the *New York Times* quoted Hamas leaders exalting over the Netanya attack.⁴²

Whereas shootings and stabbings were still more numerous, 147 suicide bombings against Israel by 164 perpetrators (including eight women) accounted for 525 of 1,084 Israeli fatalities suffered between 2000 and 2005. Another 450 attempted suicide attacks were foiled. These figures include both Hamas and non-Hamas attacks.⁴³

The Iranians, patrons of Hamas as well as Islamic Jihad, responded by brokering in Damascus coordinated suicide operations between their two Palestinian clients. According to Dennis Ross (special Middle East coordinator under President Bill Clinton and Director of Policy Planning in the State Department under President George H. W. Bush as well as a special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton), they “pushed Hamas very hard to continue the suicide bombings in Israel.” In addition, they discouraged Hamas from “leaving its calling card.” By not

claiming responsibility for some future suicide operations, Hamas made it harder for Israel to justify targeting its leadership for killing.⁴⁴

The suicide bombers' Dervish-like dance of death became a frenzy. "In the popular mind," as Paul Berman put it, "utopia and the morgue had blended." Suicide terrorism was being transformed from a means to an end, a drug-like stimulant and addiction for both Palestinian elites and masses—despite the fact that ordinary Gaza and West Bank residents suffered economically from no longer being able to commute to jobs in Israel. The irony was that neither Arafat's Fatah nor Hamas were clear political winners. Humiliated and diminished by new Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's "Operation Defensive Shield," Arafat also saw the West Bank gradually decline as a launching pad for suicide operations as a consequence of Israel's building a separation barrier. Cooped up in Gaza, Hamas was only beginning to experiment with missile launches into Israel behind the Green Line as an alternative to suicide missions.⁴⁵

The irony was that—while 60 to 80 percent of the Palestinian public during the Second Intifada approved of suicide bombing as part of a violent "national liberation" strategy (up from 40 percent during the 1990s), Hamas' own standing in the Palestinian public opinion polls remained bogged down at around 20 percent.⁴⁶

The suicide bombing epidemic transformed Palestinian culture more than it did politics. Small sects committed to "dying to kill" were not unknown in history. Particularly in that of the Middle East, such extremism had been fed by the Shia minority's deep sense of humiliation and grievance against the Sunni majority. Yet there was really no precedent for a Sunni population numbering in the millions like the Palestinians, to be caught up in a death cult for which suicide missions were an end in themselves.⁴⁷

Instrumental goals—for example, the cluster of suicide bomb attacks in March 2002 timed to torpedo that year's Saudi peace initiative—became an exception to the rule. More common were "expressive" suicide missions in which the attacker's motive was to vindicate his "honor" or demonstrate his hatred of Israel—not to achieve specific political goals. The underlying dynamic became the frenzied competition by individuals and groups to push to the head of the dying-to-kill club by attacking shopping malls and gas stations, cafés and discos, checkpoints and kibbutzim. Volunteers impulsively acting on their own were too impatient to wait to be trained. The prior pattern of recruiting bombers almost exclusively from less educated, lower class strata was broken as middle-aged men with large families and college graduates from elite backgrounds joined the fray. Mascara merged with martyrdom as women unveiled, sometimes counter to their husband's wishes, emulated Wafa Idris, the 28 year-old divorced paramedic recruited by Fatah's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade to blow herself up on Jaffa street in January 2002. She killed an octogenarian man and injured more than 150 people. Somewhat more conservative about women's role, Hamas did not deploy its first female suicide bomber until Reem Rayashi in 2004. Hamas nevertheless featured on its 2006 Gaza candidate slate Mariam

Farahat, a mother of six three of whose sons died as suicide bombers. Farahat ran and won as *Umm Nidal*: “Mother of the Struggle.” Lobbied by Muslim women who competed to be picked as suicide bombers, Farahat state her own position: “Those who say we have changed our methods, we will never change!”⁴⁸

Spanning the generations, the suicide struggle reached into the kindergartens and elementary grades, where youngsters dressed and drilled as future martyrs, coloring books glorified self-immolation as the highest form of self-expression, and picture books showed heads severed from bodies. Children were treated, not as children, but as “men and heroes” ready to be sacrificed. Gaza psychologist Fadl Abu Hein lamented, “Martyrdom has become an ambition of our children. If they had a proper education and a normal environment, they won’t have looked for a value in death.” Videos pictured the dead martyrs as avenging ninjas, sex symbols, and larger-than-life media celebrities. Martyrs in training practiced mock funerals that were also wedding rehearsals for their marriage through death to Palestine as “the martyr’s bride.” The worth of individuals was measured, not in character or accomplishment, but in machine guns and Kalashnikovs. There was a grim irony in Israeli eyes that Dr. Abdel Rantissi, Shiekh Yassin’s second in command, was trained as a pediatrician.⁴⁹

Looking for recent historical comparisons, what comes to mind are Hitler’s wish that the Germans to the last man, woman, and child follow his suicidal example and that of Eva Braun and Joseph Goebbels’ family, and the Japanese high command’s orders that every last Japanese die fighting the Allied invasion force on the beaches of the home islands—just like the suicidal defense of Okinawa. Of course, the German people chose to ignore Hitler’s *liebestod* fantasies, and the Japanese never were put to the test.⁵⁰

In March, 2004, the Israeli target assassination squad gave Sheikh Yassin the opportunity to fulfil his last wish: “If I saw the rocket coming, I would jump and hug it.” The question was whether ordinary Palestinians wanted their society permanently to be built on the commandment that “a nation that does not excel at the industry of death does not deserve life.” Ordinary Palestinians, even in the midst of this death cult, still harbored more prosaic dreams like making a secure living to support their families. The Palestinian people’s zeal for the suicide death cult seems to have waned since the Second Intifada’s closing years. Perhaps Israel’s separation barrier curbed fanaticism. We cannot rule out, however, that future events, possibly orchestrated by Hamas, may revive the Palestinians’ suicidal passion for murder as martyrdom.⁵¹

Hamas as Global-Local (Glocal) Hybrid

Almost ten years ago, University of Chicago political scientist Robert A. Pape created a stir with a book arguing that Islamic radical movements, including those notorious for suicide bombings, were not truly motivated by a sweeping global ideology. Instead, they were actually “localized” struggles to end real or perceived “foreign occupation” of places like Afghanistan and Iraq as

well as Saudi Arabia's U.S. military presence. More recently, West Point analyst Assaf Moghadam has sharply differed with Pape in his book, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, which argues that Al Qaeda's is a new kind of "transnational" terrorist movement whose ideology seeking to establish a "universal caliphate" from Madrid to Manila (and maybe in "the far enemy" America as well!) needs to be taken very seriously.⁵²

Yet despite the fact that Hamas is the offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose ideology encompasses the entire Mideast, Moghadam agrees with Pape that Hamas—unlike Al Qaeda—is indeed, a "localized" resistance movement with ambitions limited to destroying and replacing the State of Israel. After all, this is the primary objective articulated in the Charter of Hamas—an organization that, so far at least, has limited its suicide terror attacks to the Holy Land, and has even, for the record, criticized Al Qaeda for attacks on Spain, the UK and the U.S. on 9/11.⁵³

No matter whether Hamas is classified as a "global" or "local" threat, its suicide terrorism represents an existential challenge to Israel's survival. However, there is much evidence that the global vs. local distinction obscures the true nature of Hamas as a "hybrid" phenomenon—both global and local or "glocal"—that makes it as much a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East and beyond as it does to the Jewish State. As Hamas' Khalid Mishal himself explains, "Hamas is not a local organization, but the spearhead of a national project, which has Arabic, Islamic, and international ambitions" that cybercasts its messages in Arabic Farsi, Urdu, and Malay. Additional evidence can be found in many sources, including the U.S. Treasury Department's classification of Hamas as a terrorist organization with "global reach," Steven Emerson's *American Jihad* (2002)—and the especially useful study by Matthew Levitt: *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (2006).⁵⁴

Here are some of the key points:

- Hamas for decades has received as much as 85 percent of its funding from disparate worldwide sources ranging from the Gulf States, to Libya and Syria, to both Iran and Saddam Hussein's Iraq (which gave up to \$25,000 each to the families of deceased suicide bombers), to the Palestinian Diaspora in Europe and the U.S, to UN institutions. As other sources have dried up, Iran has become more and more important.⁵⁵
- In reciprocation for Iran's financing and encouraging the Palestinian terror campaigns, Hamas has reached out theologically to the Islamic Republic by distributing to its activists a booklet arguing (as summarized by Ehud Yaari) "that the Muslim Brotherhood—with Hamas as its Palestinian branch—is a natural partner of Iran, with which it shares a common set of values and a joint vision of the revival of the caliphate, despite the [historical] divide" between Sunni and Shia Islam. The author, Dr. Ahmed Yousef, is director-general Hamas' Foreign Ministry in Gaza. Considered "a moderate"

within Hamas, Yousef had prior experience as part of Mohammed Abu Marzook's circle in the U.S. where, based in Virginia, he headed "a think tank."⁵⁶

- Hamas has relied for its highest level political leadership during critical periods on an expatriate network, based officially in Syria, but less openly in the U.S., where Moussa Mohammed Abu Marzook (educated as an industrial engineer in Louisiana), was deported to Jordan in 1995, the year that Hamas was officially classified as a terrorist group by the U.S. government, and expelled to Damascus from Amman in 1999 (the Jordanians had kicked him out once before). The de facto political head of Hamas for several years when Sheikh Yassin was in an Israeli jail, Marzook began creating a remarkable series of Hamas front groups in the U.S. even before Hamas' formal creation in 1988. These groups included: the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP); the Holy Land Foundation, first established in Los Angeles and subsequently convicted for illegally funding Hamas; and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Steven Emerson persuasively traces the extremely well entrenched" created by Marzook's circle in the 1980s and early 1990s. Marzook told the FBI that he personally knew that "great man," Yehia "The Engineer" Ayyash. Marzook's foundation supported the deceased Engineer's orphaned children. Marzook's IAP also held conventions featuring authentic videos of terrorist operations and workshops on making car bombs. His associate, car dealer Mohammed Salah, ran a terrorist training camp on the outskirts of Chicago.⁵⁷
- After being forced out of the U.S. and Jordan, Marzook became Khalid Mishal's chief deputy in Hamas' "political bureau" in Syria. This was when Shiekh Yassin, released from jail in Israel, resumed his Gaza career and caught the attention of the U.S. Treasury Department which, in 2003, classified Yassin as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist."⁵⁸
- Despite the official distance it keeps from Al Qaeda, Hamas has distributed pro-bin Laden videocassettes to its rank-and-file membership—many of whom share Al Qaeda's radical jihadist ideology, rooted in fundamentalist Salafist ("pious ancestor") theology. Hamas has held secret summits with Al Qaeda operatives in locales as distant as India, and even sent a select few members to train in bin Laden's Afghan camps. For what it's worth, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas claimed in 2007 that: "It is Hamas that is shielding Al Qaeda, and through its bloody conduct, Hamas has become very close to Al Qaeda [in Gaza]."⁵⁹
- Hamas' fundraiser, Abdurahman Mohammed Alamoudi, participated in demonstrations outside the White House as well as on its guest list before his arrest and conviction for carrying \$340,000 of Libyan money to Heathrow Airport to finance a plot to kill a Saudi royal prince. He was recorded on the phone calling for someone "to hit a Zionist target in

America or Europe or elsewhere but not like what happened at the [U.S.] Embassy in Kenya” which killed only Africans!⁶⁰

- Spanish jihadist fundraiser, Muhammed Zouaydi, was raided by the Spanish police who, not only found a five-page fax showing his support for the Hamburg cell responsible for 9/11, but his financing of Hamas.⁶¹
- Hamas has toyed with establishing in the U.S. a network of independent terror agents—modelled on Aryan Nations terrorist Louis Beam’s concept of “leaderless resistance” by “lone wolves” who can operate under the FBI’s radar. Steve Emerson calls Hamas’ overseas network, a decentralized, “laterally organized” equivalent of the Communist Internationale. Hamas, even after its classification as a terrorist organization in 1995, continued clandestine operations in the U.S. that caused the FBI’s Counterterrorism Director Oliver “Buck” Revell to admit: “We didn’t know what has going on in our own backyard.”⁶²
- The FBI has been confident that America is too valuable to be directly targeted for terrorist attack because it is a “cash cow” for Hamas. Hamas profits from not only illegal donations and money transfers from Al-Taqua bank but the money laundering of profits from a whole series of criminal enterprises including drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and counterfeit products—whose operations extend from the U.S. to the terrorist-controlled zone on the Paraguay-Brazil border. Yet contrary to the FBI’s assessment, we know that Hamas planted in North America a “deep mole,” naturalized Canadian citizen Jamal Akal, with the purpose of eventually conducting terrorist operations on both sides of the border.⁶³
- Hamas’ western world front groups have been a big hit with both the extreme left and the extreme right. In the U.S., Lyndon LaRouche’s organization has shilled for Hamas, while in London the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB), with the help of the Anglican Church and the BBC, recruited extremists of every hue to huge rallies in support of Hamas. MAB President Mohammed Kassem Sawalha was accused by U.S. authorities of being “in charge of terrorist operations in the West Bank.” London has a large community of radical Saudi expatriates, forced out of their homeland, who carried their jihadist sympathies for Hamas as well as Al Qaeda to the banks of the Thames.⁶⁴

Hamas’ statements that it has no intentions “at this time” to attack the United States, have to be weighed against contrary statements including that to *Time* magazine in December 2001, that “somewhere in a Hamas safe house militants inflamed by the American war in Afghanistan are debating whether it is time to add U.S. targets in Israel and the territories to their hit list.” In 2002, nine people including five Israelis and five foreign nationals were killed and 85 injured, when a bomb exploded in the crowded Frank Sinatra cafeteria on the Hebrew University’s Mt.

Scopus campus. Three Americans died in a roadside bomb attack on a U.S. diplomatic convoy in Gaza in 2003, the same year that two Britons were recruited to attack Mike's Place, an American hangout next to the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. More ominous, in 2004, in the wake of Sheikh Yassin's assassination by the Israelis, Yassin's successor (also subsequently killed by an Israeli hit squad), Dr. Rantissi threatened to directly attack the U.S. before disowning his threat. The year earlier, he had written an article entitled: "Why Shouldn't We Attack the United States?"⁶⁵

There is a popular U.S. political slogan about how to cope with the challenges of the modern world: act locally while thinking globally. Hamas has been way ahead of its hated American enemy in doing this in its war on the western world as well as the Jewish state.

Conclusion: Why "Moderating" Hamas Won't Work

In the wake of 9/11 and the International Quartet's 2002 issuance of a "road map" for Mideast peace, European governments joined the U.S. in blacklisting Hamas' political, as well as military wings, for refusing to renounce violence and recognize Israel. Following Hamas' victory the January 2006 Palestinian elections in Gaza—when Hamas again refused to adopt non-violence and negotiate peace with Israel—western governments imposed new sanctions, cutting off economic aid.⁶⁶

Yet at the same time, momentum in key western academic and policy-making circles has been growing to "engage" Hamas (as well as its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood) on the theory that it can be "moderated" through negotiation, especially now that it supposedly faces the necessities of pragmatism and compromise in governing Gaza. Hitler wasn't "moderated" when respectable interests both inside and outside Germany tried to "engage" him during his 1932-1933 rise to power. But Hamas, we are told, is nothing like Hitler—he was "a total spoiler" while they are only a "limited spoiler"—and this time the result of "engagement" will be different.⁶⁷

One line of argument, that Hamas is capable of "moderation", points to its nine "ceasefire" offers since 1993. The term of art in Islam for a truce is *hudna* for a mutually binding cessation of hostilities which the Prophet Mohammed endorsed when there was hope an opponent might convert to Islam or when a Muslim army was too weak to expect immediate victory. In fact, until 2003 in the run up to local Palestinian elections when it first used the term *hudna*, Hamas invariably employed instead the weaker term *tahdiyah* or period of "calm" in offering a temporary, nonbinding halt to fighting. Then, in the runup to its dramatic 2006 election victory, Hamas began talking about a five or ten year *hudna* with Israel. The closest this ever came to realization was the much shorter, tentative informal agreement between Hamas and Israel during the second half of 2008—which Hamas abruptly and unilaterally ended in December 2008 with a renewed barrage of 300 missiles targeting Southern Israel and triggering Operation Cast Lead,

Israel's three-week preventative incursion into Gaza. There never was and is not now a "hudna" of demonizing Israelis.⁶⁸

On the way to winning the 2006 elections, Hamas took credit for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and for killing "the Oslo process." In power, Hamas in Gaza violated every promise made by its "Change and Reform" election ticket by creating what the London-based *ash-Sharq al Awsat* newspaper called "A Lawless Authority." It started a process of "Talibanization" by brutally suppressing real and perceived enemies of Islam more much systematically than had Arafat's Fatah ever had, not even sparing the tiny Eastern Orthodox Christian institutions where at least one nun was frightened into converting to Islam. Christian attempts to appease Hamas have never worked. As Benjamin Netanyahu put it, "Today Hamastan has been formed, a proxy of Iran in the image of the Taliban."⁶⁹

Hamas continued to use its network of tunnels from Sinai that yielded \$140 million in revenue and facilitated Iranian arms imports that have made Gaza an armed camp. When Egypt responded to Israeli and American pressure by doing something about smuggling, Hamas gunmen in January 2008 destroyed two thirds of the wall separating Sinai from Gaza. Only gradually did the Mubarak regime resume movement toward fulfilling its obligations under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to control the border in order to cut off arms shipments. As Jonathan Schanzer writes, "It was clear that any blockade designed to weaken Hamas through financial, and ultimately political, measures was in Egypt's hands."⁷⁰

From the time of its 2006 election victory and subsequent short but violent *fitna* (civil war) crushing Fatah in Gaza, Hamas' leadership—from Khalid Mishal in Damascus on down—have made it clear their objective of destroying Israel was irreversible and nonnegotiable: "The blood of our martyrs will not be wasted on the negotiating table." As if to under-score this, they launched one more suicide attack on Dimona in February 2008. Hamas fired its first rocket into Israel in 2001. During 2007 alone, Hamas fired 1,200 rockets from Gaza, 800 of which landed in Southern Israel. According to Steve Erlanger in the *New York Times*, they also further intensified their anti-Semitism. Despite declining popular support from ordinary Gazans disillusioned with an unending war sapping their quality of life, Hamas bided its time, fantasizing about a future industry of "martyrdom tourism," while rebuilding militarily as best it could in the wake of Operation Cast Lead. It fired 200 more missiles from Gaza between January and May 2009. Between 2001 and 2010, an estimated 10,000 rockets had targeted Israel.⁷¹

Then came 2011's popular Egyptian uprising replacing the Mubarak regime with who knows what. Hamas and its parent, Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, know exactly what they want - ultimately, the abrogation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. But as a preliminary to that, they want Egypt to remilitarize the Sinai as a challenge to Israel and to reopen the Gaza border to the unimpeded influx of Iranian arms shipments including improved missile technology, to bring all of the Jewish State up to Tel Aviv's suburbs in the range of accurate, powerful rockets.

By “engaging” Hamas as well as Egypt’s Brotherhood, there will indeed be a transformation of the Middle East—but not toward the desired result of “moderation.” Hamas is the crunch point where the competing Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah axis meets the Saudi-Egyptian camp. Engaging Hamas and the Brotherhood will trigger a tectonic shift against the vital interests of both Israel and the U.S. Quoting Osama bin Laden, Lee Smith in his new book argues that the smart money in the Middle East is already betting on the Iranian “strong horse” in the regional power politics derby. This outcome would transform Israel into “the weak horse”, unable to deny Hamas the ultimate prize it seeks: the destruction of the Jewish State.⁷²

About hopes to moderate Hamas, Smith comments: [T]here is little evidence that radicals are made moderate by having to solicit votes and govern. History shows that the reverse is true—radicals radicalize politics.”⁷³

As Giulio Meotti provocatively writes in *A New Shoah: The Untold Story of Israel’s Victims of Terrorism* (2010): “The silence of Chelmno and the silence after a suicide bombing, the Zyklon B of the Nazis and the explosive belts of Hamas have this much in common: the total destruction of the victim.”⁷⁴

But there the analogy ends. Israelis aren’t going anywhere and Israel will never disappear. Israeli security expert Avi Dichter puts it this way: “My parents lost their whole family during the Holocaust and they came to Israel. I don’t have any intention of going anywhere, and believe me it’s not going to happen. It is a question of time. What will happen first? Are we going to get tired or are they going to get tired? I can assure you, we are not going to get tired.”⁷⁵

APPENDIX:

Hamas' Suicide Terror Attacks, 1993-2010⁷⁶

NOTE: *The reader should bear in mind that Hamas is responsible for more suicide terror attacks (in which the terrorist's own death is part of the plan to kill his victim) than Fatah as well as more than all the other smaller radical terror groups combined. Some 80 percent of Hamas' targets have been civilian—the clear majority in Israel proper rather than Gaza and the West Bank. Attacks for which no group claimed responsibility (Hamas sometimes denied responsibility for its own attacks) have been included. On the other hand, attacks claimed by Islamic Jihad, which sometimes may have been committed instead by Hamas, have been excluded. So, too, have the much more numerous, but usually less lethal, terrorist attacks that were not planned as suicide missions.*

4/16/1993: Car bomb outside the cafeteria near the Mehola West Bank settlement kills an Arab worker. First attack for which Qassam Brigades claimed responsibility.

11/9/1993: Salman 'Id el-Hawashla, age 38, an Israeli Bedouin of the Abu Rekaik tribe who was driving a car with Israeli plates, was killed by three armed men driving a truck hijacked from the Gaza municipality, in a deliberate head-on collision.

4/6/1994: Eight people were killed in a car-bomb attack on a bus in the center of Afula. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

4/13/1994: Five people were killed in a suicide bombing attack on a bus in the central bus station of Hadera. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

10/19/1994: In a suicide bombing attack on the No. 5 bus on Dizengoff Street in Tel-Aviv, 21 Israelis and one Dutch national were killed.

3/29/1995: Two people were killed when a Palestinian driver rammed his truck into their jeep in a convoy east of the Netzarim junction in Gaza.

7/24/1995: Six people were killed in a suicide bomb attack on a bus in Ramat Gan.

8/21/1995: Four people were killed in a suicide bombing of a Jerusalem bus.

2/25/1996: In a suicide bombing of bus No. 18 near the Central Bus Station in Jerusalem, 26 were killed (17 civilians and 9 soldiers).

2/25/1996: Sgt. Hofit Ayyash, 20, of Ashdod was killed in an explosion set off by a suicide bomber at a hitch-hiking post outside Ashkelon. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

3/3/1996: In a suicide bombing of bus No. 18 on Jaffa Road in Jerusalem, 19 were killed (16 civilians and 3 soldiers).

3/4/1996: Outside Dizengoff Center in Tel-Aviv, a suicide bomber detonated a 20-kilogram nail bomb, killing 13 (12 civilians and 1 soldier).

3/21/1997: Two people were killed when a suicide bomber detonated a bomb on the terrace of a Tel Aviv cafe. 48 people were wounded.

7/30/1997: Sixteen people were killed and 178 wounded in two consecutive suicide bombings in the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem.

9/4/1997: Five people were killed and 181 wounded in three suicide bombings at the Ben-Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem.

10/29/1998: Sergeant Alexey Neykov, 19, was killed when a terrorist drove an explosives-laden car into an Israeli army jeep escorting a bus with 40 elementary school students from the settlement of Kfar Darom in the Gaza Strip.

11/22/2000: Three people were killed, and 60 wounded, when a powerful car bomb was detonated alongside a passing bus on Hadera's main street, as the area was packed with shoppers and people driving home from work. Sixty were wounded in the blast.

2/14/2001: Eight people were killed when a bus driven by a Palestinian terrorist plowed into a group of soldiers and civilians waiting at a bus stop near Holon, south of Tel-Aviv. In addition, 25 people were injured in the attack.

3/1/2001: Claude Knap, 29, of Tiberias was killed, and 9 people injured, when a terrorist detonated a bomb in a Tel Aviv to Tiberias service taxi at the Mei Ami junction in Wadi Ara.

3/4/2001: Three people were killed in a suicide bombing in downtown Netanya; sixty people were and 120 were injured. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

3/28/2001: Two people were killed in a suicide bombing at the Mifgash Hashalom ("peace stop") gas station several hundred meters from an IDF roadblock near the entrance to Kalkilya, east of Kfar Saba. Four people were injured. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

4/22/2001: One victim was killed when a terrorist detonated a powerful bomb he was carrying near a group of people waiting at a bus stop on the corner of Weizman and Tchernichovsky streets. About 60 people were injured in the blast. Hamas claimed responsibility.

5/18/2001: Five people were killed in a suicide bombing at Hasharon Mall in the seaside city of Netanya, in which over 100 were wounded. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

6/1/2001: Seventeen people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself outside a disco near Tel Aviv's Dolphinarium along the seafront promenade just before midnight on Friday. Four others died subsequently from their injuries. 120 people were wounded in the bombing.

8/9/2001: Fifteen people were killed and about 130 injured in a suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizzeria on the corner of King George Street and Jaffa Road in the center of Jerusalem. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

9/9/2001: Four people were killed and some 90 injured, most lightly, in a suicide bombing near the Nahariya train station in northern Israel.

10/7/01: Yair Mordechai, 43, of Kibbutz Sheluhot was killed when a Palestinian suicide terrorist detonated a large bomb strapped to his body, near the entrance of the kibbutz in the Beit She'an Valley.

11/4/2001: Three people were killed when a Palestinian terrorist opened fire with a sub-machine gun shortly before 16:00 on a No. 25 Egged bus at the French Hill junction in northern Jerusalem. 45 people were injured in the attack.

12/1/2001: Ten people were killed and about 180 injured—17 seriously—when explosive devices were detonated by two suicide bombers close to 11:30 P.M. Saturday night on Ben Yehuda Street, the pedestrian mall in the center of Jerusalem. A car bomb exploded nearby 20 minutes later. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. Ido Cohen, 17, of Jerusalem, fatally injured in the attack, died of his wounds on December 8.

12/2/2001: Fifteen people were killed and 40 injured in a suicide bombing on an Egged bus No. 16 in Haifa shortly after 12:00. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

3/9/2002: Ten people were killed and 54 injured, 10 of them seriously, when a suicide bomber exploded at 10:30 PM Saturday night in a crowded cafe at the corner of Aza and Ben-Maimon streets in the Rehavia neighborhood in the center of Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

3/27/2002: 28 people were killed immediately or died later of their wounds and 140 injured—20 seriously—in a suicide bombing in the Park Hotel in the coastal city of Netanya, in the midst of the Passover holiday seder with 250 guests. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

3/21/2002: 14 people were killed and over 40 injured in a suicide bombing in Haifa, in the Matza restaurant of the gas station near the Grand Canyon shopping mall. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

4/10/2002: Eight people were killed and 22 people injured in a suicide bombing on Egged bus #960, en route from Haifa to Jerusalem, which exploded near Kibbutz Yagur, east of Haifa. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

5/3/2002: IDF officer Major Avihu Ya'akov, 24, of Kfar Hasidim, was killed and two other soldiers injured in Nablus in a raid against a terror cell that was planning a suicide attack in Israel.

5/7/2002: 15 people were killed and 55 wounded at a crowded game club in Rishon Lezion, southeast of Tel-Aviv, when a suicide bomber detonated a powerful charge in the 3rd floor club, causing part of the building to collapse. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

5/19/2002: Three people were killed and 59 people were injured—10 seriously—when a suicide bomber, disguised as a soldier, blew himself up in the market in Netanya. Both Hamas and the PFLP took responsibility for the attack.

5/22/2002: Two people were killed and about 40 people were wounded when a suicide bomber detonated himself in the Rothschild Street downtown pedestrian mall of Rishon Lezion.

6/11/2002: Hadar Hershkowitz, 14, of Herzliya was killed and 15 others were wounded when a Palestinian suicide bomber set off a relatively small pipe bomb at a shwarma restaurant in Herzliya.

6/18/2002: 19 people were killed and 74 were injured—six seriously—in a suicide bombing at the Patt junction in Egged bus no. 32A traveling from Gilo to the center of Jerusalem. The bus, which was completely destroyed, was carrying many students on their way to school. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

8/4/2002: Nine people were killed and some 50 wounded in a suicide bombing of Egged bus No. 361 traveling from Haifa to Safed at the Meron junction in northern Israel. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

9/19/2002: Six people were killed and about 70 people were wounded, when a terrorist detonated a bomb in Dan bus No. 4 on Allenby Street, opposite the Great Synagogue in Tel-Aviv. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

10/10/2002: Sa'ada Aharon, 71, of Ramat Gan was killed and about 30 people were wounded, when a suicide bomber blew himself up while trying to board Dan bus No. 87 across from Bar-Ilan University on the Geva highway (Route 4). Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

10/27/2002: Three people were killed and about 20 people were wounded in a suicide bombing at the Sonol gas station at the entrance to Ariel in Samaria. The two officers and soldier were

killed while trying to prevent the terrorist from detonating the bomb. The terrorist was identified as a member of Hamas.

11/21/2002: Eleven people were killed and some 50 wounded by a suicide bomber on a No. 20 Egged bus on Mexico Street in the Kiryat Menahem neighborhood of Jerusalem. The bus was filled with passengers, including schoolchildren, traveling toward the center of the city during rush hour. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

3/5/2003: Seventeen people were killed and 53 wounded in a suicide bombing of an Egged bus #37 on Moriah Blvd. in the Carmel section of Haifa, en route to Haifa University. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

4/30/2003: Three people were murdered and about 60 people were wounded when two British suicide bombers targeted a beachfront pub catering to American tourists, "Mike's Place," in Tel Aviv. The Fatah Tanzim and Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, carried out as a joint operation.

5/17/2003: Gadi Levy and his wife Dina, aged 31 and 37, of Kiryat Arba were killed by a suicide bomber in Hebron. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

5/18/2003: Seven people were killed and 20 wounded in a suicide bombing on Egged bus no. 6 near French Hill in Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. A second suicide bomber detonated his bomb when intercepted by police in northern Jerusalem. The terrorist was killed; no one else was injured.

6/11/2003: Seventeen people were killed and over 100 wounded in a suicide bombing on Egged bus #14A outside the Klal building on Jaffa Road in the center of Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

8/13/2003: Yehezkel (Hezi) Yekutieli, 43, of Rosh Ha'ayin, was murdered by a teenaged Palestinian suicide bomber who detonated himself as Yekutieli was shopping for his children's breakfast at his local supermarket.

8/12/2003: Erez Hershkovitz, 18, of Eilon Moreh, was killed by a Palestinian teenager who detonated himself at a bus stop outside Ariel less than half an hour after the Rosh Ha'ayin attack. Amatzia Nisanevitch, 22, of Nofim, died of his wounds on August 28.

8/19/2003: Twenty-three people were murdered and 134 wounded when a Palestinian suicide bomber detonated himself on a No. 2 Egged bus in Jerusalem's Shmuel Hanavi neighborhood. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

9/9/2003: Eight IDF soldiers were killed and 32 people were wounded in a suicide bombing at a hitch-hiking post for soldiers outside a main entrance to the Tzrifin army base and Assaf Harofeh Hospital. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

9/9/2003: Seven people were killed and over 50 wounded when a suicide bomber at Cafe Hillel on Emek Refaim St., the main thoroughfare of the German Colony neighborhood in Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

1/14/2004: Four people were killed and 10 wounded when a female suicide bomber detonated a bomb at the Erez Crossing in the Gaza Strip. Hamas and the Fatah Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed joint responsibility for the attack.

1/29/2004: Eleven people were killed and over 50 wounded, 13 of them seriously, in a suicide bombing of an Egged bus no. 19 at the corner of Gaza and Arlozorov streets in Jerusalem. Both the Fatah-related Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, naming the bomber as Ali Yusuf Jaara, a 24-year-old Palestinian policeman from Bethlehem.

3/14/2004: Ten people were killed and 16 wounded in a double suicide bombing at Ashdod Port. Hamas and Fatah claimed responsibility for the attack.

4/17/2004: Border Policeman Cpl. Kfir Ohayon, 20, of Eilat was killed, three others wounded when a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up at the Erez Crossing. Hamas and Fatah claimed joint responsibility for the attack.

8/31/2004: Sixteen people were killed and 100 wounded in two suicide bombings within minutes of each other on two Beersheba city buses, on route nos. 6 and 12. The buses were traveling along Beersheba's main street, Rager Blvd, near the city hall. Hamas in Hebron claimed responsibility for the attack.

1/18/2005: Oded Sharon, 36, from Gan Yavne, an ISA officer, was killed, an IDF officer seriously wounded, and four IDF soldiers and three members of the ISA were lightly wounded in a suicide bombing attack at the Gush Katif junction in the central Gaza Strip. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack.

11/9/2005: Hussam Fathi Mahajna, 36, an Israeli Arab businessman from Umm al-Fahm, was among 57 people murdered and 300 wounded in simultaneous attacks by suicide bombers in Amman, Jordan at three luxury hotels. Mahajna was a guest at a wedding held at the Radisson Hotel, known to be popular with Israeli tourists. Al-Qaida claimed responsibility for the attacks.

3/30/2006: Four people were killed when a suicide bomber hitch-hiker, disguised as an ultra-Orthodox yeshiva student, detonated his explosive device in a private vehicle near the entrance to Kedumim.

2/4/2008: Lyubov Razdolskaya, 73, of Dimona was killed and 38 wounded—Razdolskaya’s husband critically—in a terror attack carried out by a suicide bomber at a shopping center in Dimona. A police officer shot and killed a second terrorist before he detonated his explosive belt. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack and praised it as an “heroic act.”

7/2/2008: Three people were killed and over 50 wounded in a terror attack in Jerusalem. Driving a bulldozer on Jaffa Road between the Central Bus Station and the Mahane Yehuda market, the terrorist plowed into cars and pedestrians as well as two public buses (Egged buslines 13 and 60) carrying some 50 passengers. Police shot and killed the terrorist.

NOTES

¹ “ Hamas Covenant 1988,” Avalon Project, Yale Law School, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp>. Incredibly, Azam Tamimi argues without any evidence that a new Hamas Charter is in the works that would eliminate all the objectionable features of the old one, including the invocation of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. See Tamimi, *Hamas: A History from Within* (Northampton, MA: Interlink Publishing Group, 2011), pp. 150-55.

² Assaf Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), quoting Sura 8:13 and 8:17. For anti-Jewish prejudice in traditional Muslim religious sources, see Andrew G. Bostom, ed., *The Legacy of Islamic Antisemitism* (New York: Prometheus Books, 2008).

³ Robert S. Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad* (New York: Random House, 2010), p. 733 (quote). The phrase comes from the title of a book by Sheikh As’ad at-Tamimi, former Imam of the al-Aqsa Mosque. See Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, *The Road to Martyr’s Square: A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 63.

⁴ Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession*, p. 746 (quote).

⁵ *Ibid.* (quote).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 933 (quote). In addition to New York’s Central Park, the slogan has been shouted by pro-Hamas demonstrators in Amsterdam within earshot of the Anne Frank House. See Bruce Thornton, *Decline and Fall: Europe’s Slow Motion Suicide* (New York: Encounter Books, 2007), p. 120; and “Netherlands: ‘Jews to the Gas!’,” *Jihad Watch*, <<http://www.jihadwatch.org/2009/01/netherlands-hamas-hamas-jews-to-the-gas.html>>.

⁷ Raphael Israeli, *Fundamentalist Islam and Israel: Essays in Interpretation* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), p. 153 (quote).

⁸ May 1988 pamphlet, quoted in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 52.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 52 (quoting a January 1988 pamphlet).

¹⁰ Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, p. 759 (quoting Sheikh Ahmed Yassin).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 746-47 (747 quote). See also on the demonization of Jews as “sons of monkeys and pigs” (*ibna al-qird wa al-Khanazir*), Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, pp. 101-03; and Aluma Solnick, “Based on Koranic Verses, Interpretations, and Traditions, Muslim Clerics State: The Jews Are the Descendants of Apes, Pigs, And Other Animals,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), *Special Report No. 11* (November 1, 2002), <<http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/754.htm>>.

¹² *Wall Street Journal*, December 18, 1992 (quote). This slogan is sometimes also attributed to Hezbollah. See *Know Them By Their Words*, <<http://www.shalomjerusalem.com/mohammedism/mohammedism14.html>>.

¹³ Steve Stalinsky, “How Hamas Greeted 9/11,” *New York Sun*, April 5, 2006, <<http://www.nysun.com/foreign/how-hamas-greeted-9-11/30415/>>, quoting Dr. Atallah Abu Al-Subh in an open letter “To America,” that appeared in Hamas’ *Al-Risala*, September 13, 2001.

¹⁴ Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, p. 93 (quote).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 122 (quote).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, xxii (quote).

¹⁷ Jerome Gunning, *Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 176, quoting *Jerusalem Post*, December 11, 2003, on Hamas university student electioneering.

¹⁸ Rashmi Singh, *Hamas and Suicide Terrorism: Multi-Causal and Multi-Level Approaches* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 75 (quoting Hamas song).

¹⁹ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 112 (quote).

²⁰ Singh, *Hamas*, p. 71 (Aziz quote); Matthew Levitt, *Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 1 (Farahat quote); Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 110 (heresy quote).

²¹ Paul McGeough, *Kill Khalid: The Failed Mossad Assassination of Khalid Mishal and the Rise of Hamas* (New York: The New Press, 2009), p. 126; Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p. 131.

²² Beverly Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, *Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p. 9 (Netanyahu quote). We need studies of media bias in the mainstream media since the 1960s in the tradition of Deborah E. Lipstadt’s *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust, 1933-1945* (New York: Free Press, 1986) and Laurel Leff’s *Buried by the Times: The Holocaust and America’s Most Important Newspaper* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Jeffrey Tischauser’s *Anti-Arab and Anti-Muslim Bias in American Newspapers: How They Reported the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah and Israeli-Hamas Wars* (Lewiston, Maine: Edwin Mellin, 2010) is the opposite of what we need.

²³ Hamas stands for *Harakat al Muqawama al-Islamiyya* or “the Islamic Resistance Movement.” For the 1930s background, see Ann M. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917-1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979); and Klaus-Michael Mallmann, Martin Cuppers, and Krista Smith, *Nazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine* (New York: Enigma Books, 2010).

²⁴ Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 37; David G. Dalin and John F. Rothmann, *Icon of Evil: Hitler’s Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam* (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 139-41.

²⁵ Shai Lachman, “Arab Rebellions and Terrorism in Palestine, 1929-1939: The Case of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his Movement,” in *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel*, ed. by Eli Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (London: Frank Case, 1981), pp. 52-99; Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, pp. 65, 159.

²⁶ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, p. 32; Martin Gilbert, *In Ishmael’s House: A History of Jews in Muslim Lands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 220; Alison Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition* (London: Saqi Books, 2010), p. 196; Paul Berman, *The Flight of the Intellectuals* (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2010), p. 38.

²⁷ Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, pp. 32-33, 36, 48; Ziad Abu-Amr, “Shaykh Amad Yassin and the Origins of Hamas,” in *Spokesmen for Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the Middle East*, ed. by R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), pp. 26-31. The 1929 date on his birth certificate is probably wrong.

²⁸ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, p. 53; Hillel Frisch, “Hamas: The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood,” in *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement*, ed. by Barry Rubin (New York: Macmillan, 2010), pp. 90-91; Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, pp. 28, 47.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 26; Frisch, “Hamas: The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood,” in *The Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 91; Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 156-57; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 115-20.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 52-56; Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, p. 756; Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, pp. xi, 67; Nathan J. Delong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 240-41; Shmuel Bar, *Jihad Ideology in Light of Contemporary Fatwas*, Research Monographs on the Muslim World, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, September, 2006). Franz Rosenthal, “On Suicide in Islam,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 66, 3 (July-September, 1946), pp. 239-59; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 146-48.

³¹ Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, pp. 14-15, 21, 102-03, 106; Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, P. 201; Laqueur, *New Terrorism*, pp.141-42; Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, p. xxii.

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- ³² Bat Ye'or, *Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide*, trans. by Miriam Kochan and David Littman (Teaneck, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002), p. 218
- ³³ Benjamin W. Segel, *A Lie and A Libel: The History of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, trans. by Richard S. Levy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995 [1926]); Stephen E. Bronner *A Rumor about the Jews: Antisemitism, Conspiracy, and the Protocols of Zion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, p. 736 (quote); Gabriel Schoenfeld, *The Return of Anti-Semitism* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004), pp. 85-100.
- ³⁴ David Aaronovitch, *Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History* (New York: Riverhood Books, 2010), p. 47 (quote).
- ³⁵ Deborah Lipstadt, *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory* (New York: Plume Books, 1994), pp. 24, 152; Daniel Pipes, *Conspiracy: How the Paranoid Style Flourishes and Where It Comes From* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), pp. 122, 190; Martha Minow, "The Persistence of Falsehood and *The Protocols*," in *From the Protocols of the Elders of Zion to Holocaust Denial Trials*, ed. by Deborah Kaufman *et al.* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 2007), pp. 48, 55 note 11; Aaronovitch, *Voodoo Histories*, pp. 46-49. Hamas' Charter omits any reference to the Holocaust, yet Ron Rosenbaum writes that Hamas shows "no shyness about a second Holocaust." See Rosenbaum, *How the End Begins: The Road to a Nuclear World War III* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), p. 134.
- ³⁶ Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 101; Walter Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 238; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 122-23.
- ³⁷ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 45-51, 65-73; Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 106-35. Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, p. 127; Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, pp. 36-37; Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, p. 32; Loretta Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp. 178-80; Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 80; Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 52-56.
- ³⁸ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 77-78, 123; Pape, *Dying to Win*, pp. 57-58.
- ³⁹ Ephraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 182; Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds*, p. 16; Laqueur, *The New Terrorism*, p. 139; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 80-81, 123; Fouad Ajami, *The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), p. 307.
- ⁴⁰ McGeough, *Kill Khalid* pp. 206-09, 236-38; Kepel, *Jihad*, p. 323; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, p. 220; Phyllis Chesler, *The New Anti-Semitism* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003), p. 64.
- ⁴¹ Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds*, pp. 14, 18-19; Singh, *Hamas and Suicide Terrorism*, pp. 61-62; Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, p. 47; Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, p. 208.

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- ⁴² Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 3-4; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 3-5, 134; Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, p. 23; Ron Rosenbaum, “ ‘Second Holocaust’, Roth’s Invention Isn’t Novelistic,” in *Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism*, ed. by Rosenbaum (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 175.
- ⁴³ Moghadam, *Globalization of Martyrdom*, p. 23.
- ⁴⁴ Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 14-15, 172-73; Schoenfeld, *Return of Anti-Semitism*, p. 48.
- ⁴⁵ Berman, *Terror and Liberalism*, p. 133 (quote); Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, p. 103; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 298-302.
- ⁴⁶ Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, 204-05.
- ⁴⁷ David Cook, *Martyrdom in Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). pp. 44-45, 149, 153, 163-65.
- ⁴⁸ Singh, *Hamas and Suicide Terrorism*, pp. 64-65, 71, 92; Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, p. 24; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 95, 195-96; Mark Steyn, *America Alone* (Washington, D. C.: Regnery Publishing, 2006, p. 145; Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 1 (quote), 113-15.
- ⁴⁹ Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr’s Square*, pp. 73-76, 79, 83-84, 114, 160; Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 111 (quote), 136-41; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, p. 144.
- ⁵⁰ Laqueur, *New Terrorism*, pp. 140-41; Ian Kershaw, *Hitler: A Biography* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2008), p. 785, 851; Jeffrey Herf, *The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and The Holocaust* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 231-63; John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 246-47; Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2009), pp. 34-63.
- ⁵¹ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 136, 148; Berman, *Terror and Liberalism*, pp. 112, 129. “The industry of death” quote is by Egyptian Brotherhood leader Mohamed Habib. See Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 197.
- ⁵² Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, pp. 30-36, 44-45, 54-56. 60.
- ⁵³ Moghadam, *Globalization of Martyrdom*, pp. 55-60.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 59; Levitt, *Hamas*, p. 9 (quote), 142, 210.
- ⁵⁵ Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, pp. 70-71; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas* p. 140; Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, p. 110; Levitt, *Hamas*, p. 95; Levitt, *Hamas*, pp.171-202. For informed speculation that Iran may be using this leverage in 2011 to tilt the Mideast toward a new Palestinian-Israeli war, see Reva Bhalla, “Implications of the Attacks in Israel,” *Stratfor Geopolitical Intelligence Report*, in *Jewish World Review* (March 24, 2011), <<http://jewishworldreview.com/0311/stratfor032411.php3>>; and also Meir Amit Intelligence and

Terrorism Information Center, *Terrorism from the Gaza Strip since Operation Cast Lead: Data, Type and Trends* (March 3, 2011), < <http://sderotmedia.org.il/bin/content.cgi?ID=767&q=7>>; Yaakov Katz, “‘Victoria’ Served as ‘First Test’ of Iranian Infrastructure,” *Jerusalem Post*, March 18, 2011, <<http://www.allvoices.com/s/event-8479178/aHR0cDovL3d3dy5qcG9zdC5jb20vRGVmZW5zZS9BcnRpY2xlLmFzcHg/SUQ9MjEjEjE1JmFtcDtSPVIX>>.

⁵⁶ Ehud Yaari, “Sunni Hamas and Shiite Iran Form a Common Political Theology,” *Policy Watch*, No. 1716 (November 9, 2010).

⁵⁷ Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 11, 28-29, 42-43, 145-52, 215; Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us* (New York: Free Press, 2002), pp. 81-82, 84, 86-87; McGeough, *Kill Khalid*, p. 106; Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 184; Mishal and Sela, *Palestinian Hamas*, p. 88. Emerson goes so far as to argue that the early versions of Hamas’ Charter were drawn up—not in Gaza.

⁵⁸ Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 40-47, 145-52. 215.

⁵⁹ Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p.131 (quote), 133-35.

⁶⁰ Levitt, *Hamas*, p. 153 (quote), 187-88; Vidino, *New Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 2

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 167.

⁶² Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom*, pp.113, 137-38; Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 220-24; Emerson, *American Jihad*, pp. 83 (quote), 192. For Al Qaeda’s advocacy of “leaderless resistance,” see Muhammed Khalil Al-Hakaymah, “Toward a New Strategy in Resisting the Occupier,” in *The Canons of Jihad: Terrorists’ Strategy for Defeating America*, ed. by Jim Lacey (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 150-55.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 70-71, 169, 207-08, 214.

⁶⁴ Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 143; Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2006), p. 17, 151; Vidino, *New Muslim Brotherhood*, pp. 88,140. 179; Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad*, pp. 132-33, 173.

⁶⁵ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, p. 314; Levitt, *Hamas*, p. 203, 206 (quote), 209, 217.

⁶⁶ Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, p. 164.

⁶⁷ Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, 195-96; Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2003), <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1716.pdf>; Robert Leiken and Stephen Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” *Foreign Affairs* (March-April, 2007), <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62453/robert-s-leiken-and-steven-brooke/the-moderate-muslim-brotherhood>>; “Changing Course: A New Direction of U.S. Relations with the Muslim World,” *Report of*

the Leadership Group on U.S.-Muslim Engagement, U.S.-Muslim Engagement Project, September, 2008, <http://www.usmuslimengagement.org/storage/usme/documents/Changing_Course_SecondPrinting.pdf>.

⁶⁸ Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, p. 222; Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession*, p. 932; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas*, pp. 244, 296, 313, 316; Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, pp. 195-96, 220-21; Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp. 159-60.

⁶⁹ Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, p. 177; Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 110-11; Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Teaneck, NJ: Farleigh University Press, 2005), pp. 130, 182; Ye'or, *Islam and Dhimmitude*, p. 394.

⁷⁰ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas* p. 131; Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession*, p. 760; Levitt, *Hamas*, pp. 86-87; Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah* 117, 167-69, 170 (quote).

⁷¹ Gunning, *Hamas in Politics*, pp. 226, 236; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas* pp. 131, 149-50, 155, 294, 303-04, 313; Wistrich, *A Lethal Obsession*, p. 762; Oliver and Steinberg, *Road to Martyr's Square*, p. 55 (quote); Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah*, pp. 62, 109, 182, 193; Zaki Chehab, *Inside Hamas* (New York: Nation Books, 2007), p. 202; Menachem Klein, "Hamas in Power," *Middle East Journal*, 61, 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 442-459.

⁷² Frisch, "Hamas: The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood," in *The Muslim Brotherhood*. P. 102; Pargeter, *Muslim Brotherhood*, pp. 199-200; Hillel Frisch, "Hamas: The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood," in *The Muslim Brotherhood*, p. 109; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas* p. 148; Wistrich, *Lethal Obsession*, p. 761; Lee Smith, *The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations* (New York: Anchor Books, 2011), pp. 9, 135-36.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 116 (quote).

⁷⁴ Giulio Meotti, *A New Shoah: The Untold Story of Israel's Victims of Terrorism* (New York: Encounter Books, 2010), p. 22 (quote).

⁷⁵ Milton-Edwards and Farrell, *Hamas* p. 133 (quote).

⁷⁶ "Fatal Terrorist Attacks in Israel Since the Declaration of Principles (September 1993-August 31, 2010)," based on information compiled by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, *Jewish Virtual Library*, <<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:y5OC-NQXRjsJ:www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/victims.html+%22french+hill%22+junction+terrorist&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=13>>.